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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 1986; President Reagan announced a program call-
ing for mandatory drug testing for federal employees whose positions de-
mand a high degree of public trust and confidence.' Employees affected
by this program include those involved in law enforcement, public health
and safety, and air traffic control. 2 Because of this program, up to 1.2
million federal employees will be required to submit to drug tests.' Most
people are not aware of what drug testing actually involves. The effect of
this program is that "men and women alike will have to expose [them-
1. Reidinger, Reagan's Drug Testing Policy, 72 A.B.A. J. 53 (Nov. 1986).
2. Id. at 53.
3. Id.
1
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selves] before a government ... witness" and produce a urine sample for
analysis. 4 Assistant United States Attorney General Richard Willard stated
that the purpose of these tests was to instill fear into the American people
and thereby help to eliminate drug abuse.' Advocates of drug testing have
one point in their favor: it works.6 However, the more difficult question
is whether mandatory drug testing can survive constitutional scrutiny.7
This Comment wil examine what recourse, if any, is available to gov-
ernment employees required to submit to drug testing.' It will examine the
drug testing issue in light of the right to due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, the fifth amendment protection against self-in-
crimination, and the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. The Comment will also examine the present state of
Missouri law and the implications for the drug testing issues that will,
undoubtedly, arise here. Finally, it will attempt to draw some conclusions
concerning the state of the law on mandatory employee drug testing at
present and its implications for the future.
4. This is required in order to establish a "chain of custody" to make the
test legally valid. See Dujack, An Unhealthy Speciman, Drug Tests are Unconstitutional
and Sometimes Wrong, Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1986, at C5, col. 4.
5. Reidinger, supra note 1, at 53.
6. Dujack, supra note 4, at C5, col. 4. According to a Washington Post
article:
Georgia Power Co. saw work-related injury rates drop by more than
90 percent after instituting drug-testing.
The Southern Pacific Railway reduced on-the-job accidents by more
than 70 percent.
In the Navy, illegal drug use itself dropped from 48 percent of enlistees
to 4 percent.
Id.
7. One district court has stated:
No doubt most employers consider it undesirable for employees to use drugs,
and would like to be able to identify any who use drugs. Taking and testing
body fluid specimens, as well as conducting searches and seizures of other
kinds, would help the employer discover drug use and other useful infor-
mation about employees. There is no doubt about it - searches and seizures
can yield a wealth of information useful to the searcher. (That is why King
George III's men so frequently searched the colonists). That potential, how-
ever, does not make a governmental employer's search of an employee a
constitutionally reasonable one.
Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (quoting McDonell
v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D.C. Iowa 1985)). In Bostic, the court examined
the constitutionality of testing police officers suspected of marijuana use.
8. When dealing with mandatory drug testing of government employees,
finding state action will generally not be an issue. Because a discussion of what
constitutes state action is beyond the scope of this Comment, the Comment will be
confined to situations concerning government employers and employees.
2
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING
A. Drug Testing as a Violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
One source of constitutional limitation on the mandatory drug testing
of federal employees is the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. 9
In Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 0 a
case involving mandatory blood or urine testing, a bus drivers' union chal-
lenged on due process grounds" the constitutionality of rules "requiring bus
drivers to submit to blood or urine tests following their involvement in a
serious accident or when they were suspected of being intoxicated or under
the influence of narcotics."'' 2 In setting forth the standard of review, the
court stated that:
The test of constitutionality for invasions of a-public employee's protected
rights are derived from the nature of the rights involved. Where the employee
argues he is being deprived of a right specifically protected by the Consti-
tution, the standard generally applicable to deprivations of that right pre-
vail .... [W]here the employee asserts that his right is protected by the
general ambit of the fourteenth amendment, the state need show only that
the rule is reasonable., '
The court further stated that any due process claims failed, finding that "a
governmental agency can place reasonable conditions on public employ-
ment."
4
9. The fifth amendment provides that: "No person shall be ...deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The fourteenth amendment provides that: "[No] state [shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
10. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976).
11. Id. at 1266. Petitioners also objected to the chemical testing on the grounds
that it violated their fourth amendment rights. Id.
12.. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1264.
13. Id. at 1266; see also Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (regu-
lations regarding length of police officers' hair were valid absent a showing by pe-
titioners that there was "no rational connection between the regulation ... and the
promotion of safety of persons and property." Kelly, 425 U.S. at 247 (footnotes
omitted).
14. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267. The court considered the alleged violation of the
fourteenth amendment with the alleged violation of the fourth amendment, and in
their final analysis decided that "the public interest in the safety of mass transit riders
outweighs any individual interest in refusing to disclose physical evidence of intoxi-
cation or drug abuse." Id.
19871
3
Mell: Mell: Employee Drug Testing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
The Supreme Court in Kelly v. Johnson5 addressed a state's attempt to
regulate a "substantive liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment."'' 6 In so doing, the Court balanced the state's interest in regulation
against the plaintiff's interest in liberty. The Court characterized the consti-
tutional issue as "whether petitioner's determination that such regulations
should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded 'arbitrary' and
therefore a deprivation of respondent's 'liberty' interest in freedom to choose
his own hairstyle."' 7 The result of this test was to defeat the respondent's
liberty interest.'8
Ten years later, the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia
in Jones v. McKenzie,' 9 reviewed the case of Juanita Jones, a school bus
attendant discharged for alleged marijuana use discovered in a drug test
conducted by her employer.2 Plaintiff challenged her dismissal on the grounds
that her discharge was arbitrary and capricious, thus violating her rights
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 2'
The rules which governed the plaintiff's employment provided for ter-
mination only for cause which "shall not be arbitrary or capricious." 22 The
court held that this conferred "a property interest which [could] not be taken
by a government employer without due process." 23 The court also found that
the plaintiff had a liberty interest because "the discharge of plaintiff on
unsupported charges of drug abuse could severely affect her interest in her
good name, reputation, honor or integrity."' ' Because of such a deprivation
of her liberty and property interests, fifth amendment due process require-
ments were triggered.25
Once it established that a liberty or property interest existed, the court
next examined how much process was given to the plaintiff. 26 The plaintiff
15. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
16. Id. at 245.
17. Id. at 248. The Court characterized the policy of the police regulation as
either "a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to ... the public, or a
desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police
force itself." Id.
18. Id.
19.. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
20. Id. at 1503.
21. Id. at 1501. Plaintiff also alleged that her discharge was in violation of
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure and her
right to privacy. See infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
22. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1504. The court opinion sets out the pertinent
parts of the Board of Education rules for termination of employees. Id.
23. Id.; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
24. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1505-06.
[Vol. 52
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established that "the EMIT test 27 was the sole basis for the defendants'
decision to terminate her employment. ' 28 The court found the need for
confirmation of the test to be apparent from "numerous decisions by state
and federal courts around the country," 29 and further found that such con-
firmation was not effected by a manual rerun of an automated EMIT test.30
Because of the lack of confirmation, the court held that the plaintiff's dis-
charge was arbitrary and capricious, and thus violated her due process rights.3 1
The court's final order stated that "before defendant can terminate plaintiff
again on grounds of drug abuse, they must confirm a positive EMIT test
result by an alternative process. 3 2
Clearly, after McKenzie there is a right to some sort of due process
when a government employer seeks to terminate an employee. Questions
which remain unanswered in this area include: first, how much due process
is required; and second, if this rule applies to pre-employment screening as
well.
27. The Enzyme Multiple Immune Assay Technique (EMIT) is an inexpensive
urine screen, not unlike a home pregnancy test. It is normally used for the initial
stage of drug testing. Antibodies specifically designed to detect the presence of certain
drugs are added to vials of urine, which change color when those drugs are present.
The tests cost $15-$25 each, and the necessary equipment costs about $5,000. Rust,
The Legal Dilemma, 72 A.B.A. J. 51 (1986).
28. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1505. The manufacturer's label on the EMIT
test contained a clear warning that "positive results should be confirmed by an
alternate method." Id. Other experts which state the need for subsequent confir-
matory tests when using EMIT to discover marijuana use include a scientific advisory
written by the U.S. Center for Disease Control (published by the Public Health Service
of the Department of Health and Human Services) and toxicologists in a letter pub-
lished in the Journtal of the American Medical Association. Id. at 1506.
29. Id. at 1506; see, e.g., Anable v. Ford, 663 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1985);
Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
30. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1506. But cf. Peranzo v. Coughlln, 608 F.
Supp. 1504, 1507, 1514 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denied preliminary injunctive relief
for disciplinary proceedings against prison inmates on the basis of unconfirmed EMIT
test).
31. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1506.
32. Id. Adequate alternative methods available at this time include thin layer
chromatography and gas chromatography. J. ANNiNOL & R. GRESE, CLINICAL CHEM-
ISTRY PRNCIPLES & PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1976). A new method being developed is
brainwave-form reading:
[An] example of promising developments is ... [a] new technique that seems
to be cheaper, faster and much less invasive than existing blood and urine
tests and more reliable. The Veritas 100 Analyzer is a micro-computer-based
software program that uses a plastic headband to obtain a brainwave-form
reading. This produces a distinctive "signature" if alcohol, marijuana or
cocaine is active in the individual's system at the time of the test.
Westin, Drug Testing vs. Employee Privacy: Long Struggle for Fairness Lies Ahead,
L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, § 2, at 5, col. 1.
1987]
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The inadequacy of the EMIT test was not the only ground the court
used to invalidate the plaintiff's discharge. The Supreme Court in Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill,33 held that a deprivation of property by
terminating employment must be "preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." ' 34 The McKenzie court found
the discharge violated the Loudermill standard as well and held that it "af-
ford[ed] a second ground for a decision in her favor." 35 However, the court
in McKenzie did not describe what form of pre-termination hearing would
be sufficient. 36 It did suggest that "at a minimum ... before plaintiff can
be discharged on account of a urine test positive for drugs, some adversary
process is in order to determine that (1) she is, in fact, the subject of the
particular positive test, and (2) that the positive test has been appropriately
confirmed." 37
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
in Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga38 also held that due process required
that the city's fire fighters be provided with a hearing prior to termination.3 9
However, the court found that the pre-termination and post-termination hear-
ings provided by the city satisfied due process. 40
Thus, it appears that the courts have yet to set forth a clear standard
of how much due process is required. It is clear that the requirement is
greater than the standard afforded in McKenzie; and that that given in Lov-
vorn was sufficient. In other words, a pre-termination hearing is minimal
33. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
34. Id. at 1493 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
35. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1507. In McKenzie, "the plaintiff had no
hearing before she was terminated and her post-discharge hearing was limited to a
written submission." Id. The court held the absence of a hearing before her discharge
was sufficient to establish her procedural due process claim. Id.
36. Id. The court stated it was "neither necessary nor appropriate" for them
to describe a sufficient pre-termination hearing. Id.
37. Id. The court further held that the requirement of a pre-termination hear-
ing "need not preclude temporary reassignment, or even suspension, pending con-
firmation of a positive EMIT test and a hearing [because of the] public's vital interest
in the safety of school children. . . ." Id. However, the court allowed this only
"provid[ing] that the hearing is held and the issue resolved promptly, and, if plaintiff
survives the confirmation test and the hearing, she is fairly compensated for any loss
incurred on account of the reassignment or suspension." Id.
38. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
39. Id. at 883. The court stated that: "Due process entitle[d] each fire fighter
to oral or written notice of the charges against them, an explanation of the evidence,
and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story." Id. (quoting Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985)).
40. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883. The fire fighters were given a pre-termi-
nation hearing by the chief of the Chattanooga fire department. They were also given
post-termination hearings before the City Commission, and state law gave them an
opportunity to appeal the commission's decision in the state courts. Id.
[Vol. 52
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and the extent to which the employer provides for further protection of his
employees will weigh heavily in a court's determination of the program's
validity under due process.
The issue of whether this standard applies to potential employees as well
as regular employees has not been decided by the courts. However, while
the potential employee might not have a property interest as recognized in
McKenzie and Lovvorn,41 the employee would still have a liberty interest in
his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity," giving him a cause of action
under the due process clause. 42
The decisions thus far in the area of due process can be summarized as
follows: substantive due process offers protection of the employee's liberty
interest in his reputation, 43 while procedural due process offers protection
for the employee's property interest in his employment.4 The courts will
balance the important interests of the state45 against the legitimate liberty or
property interest of the employee. 46 It is important to note, however, that
relief on due process grounds does not prevent the employer from admin-
istering the test. Instead, it gives the employee the right to more process or
more tests. For that reason, this constitutional protection is more appropriate
in circumstances where the employee claims he was wrongfully discharged
because of inadequate testing procedures than cases where the employee finds
the test offensive and seeks to avoid it entirely. In the latter situation, a
challenge on the basis of the fifth amendment could be more appropriate.
B. Drug Testing as a Violation of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A second constitutional challenge to the mandatory drug testing of fed-
eral employees is found in the law protecting criminal defendants against
self-incrimination. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
41. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (D.D.C. 1986); Lovvorn,
647 F. Supp. at 883.
42. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883; McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1505.
43. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976); Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1976); Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp.
at 883; McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1505.
44. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985);
Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883; McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1505.
45. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1266 (7th Cir. 1976) (state has right to require bus drivers involved in serious accidents
or suspected of drug use to submit to drug testing); see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425
U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (state has interest in regulating policemen's hairstyle); Lovvorn,
647 F. Supp. at 883 (state's right to test fire fighters for use of drugs and to dismiss
after hearing is valid under due process).
46. See Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1493; Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883;
McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. at 1507.
19871
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states that "[n]o person shall be ...compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. . . . -47 The prerequisites for applying this provision
to employee drug testing are twofold. First, the taking of urine for testing
must be found to be within the scope of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; and second, the testing must be found to be encompassed by the
concept of, a "criminal case" within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
The question of whether chemical tests are within the scope of the fifth
amendment was decided by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber
v. State of California.48 In Schmerber, the defendant had a blood test taken
in the hospital to determine his blood alcohol level. 49 The defendant con-
tended that the evidence from the blood analysis was inadmissible because
it was taken in violation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination. 0 The Supreme Court held that "the protection of the privilege reaches
an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the com-
pulsion of responses which are also communications.... ."I' However, the
Court distinguished between the compulsion of communication or testimonial
evidence and the compulsion that "makes a suspect or accused the source
of 'real or physical evidence."' 5 2 The Court held that only communications
were protected under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 3 The Supreme Court stated that:
[Schmerber's] testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his
participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test,
which depend on chemical analysis... alone. Since the blood test evidence,
although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's
testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by
the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.54
Assuming that this was the only authority regarding the applicability of the
fifth amendment to chemical analysis, it would be safe to say that the fifth
47. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
48. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
49. Id. at 758. The blood sample, although taken at the hospital while re-
ceiving treatment for injuries, was taken at the direction of the police, and was used
as evidence in Schmerber's criminal trial for driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. Id. at 758-59.
50. Id. at 759. The defendant also objected to the chemical analysis on the
basis of the fourteenth amendment due process clause and his right not to be subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment. Id.
51. Id. at 763-64.
52. Id. at 764. The Court listed several forms of physical evidence which both
state and federal courts held as unprotected. This list included the "compulsion to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make
a particular gesture." Id.
53. Id. at 765.
54. Id. (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 52
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amendment offers federal employees no protection from mandatory drug
testing. However, not all sources agree with this narrowing of the fifth
amendment privilege. The Supreme Court in Schmerber cautioned that "[t]o
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to
determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses,"
whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the fifth amend-
ment." '56 However, the Court went on to say that chemical tests were not
entitled to this protection.57 Justice Black, dissenting in Schmerber, wrote
that while the chemical test is "not oral testimony given by an accused...
it can certainly 'communicate' to a court and jury the fact of guilt." 58
In U.S. v. Ruiz, 9 the Court of Military Appeals examined the issue of
self-incrimination through compulsion to furnish a urine specimen for uri-
nalysis for the Army's Drug Abuse and Rehabilitation Program. 0 The priv-
ilege against self-incrimination as codified in Article 31(a) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, provides: "No person subject to this chapter may
compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the
answer to which may tend to incriminate himself.' '6 In this case, the Court
of Military Appeals held that the order to the defendant to submit to drug
testing was unlawful because it violated his right against self-incrimination
as set out in Article 31(a). 62 In so holding, however, the court acknowledged
that the scope of Article 31 was broader than the fifth amendment, 63 thereby
distinguishing the case from Schmerber v. State of California.61
One district court had recently held that drug testing was a violation of
the employee's fifth amendment rights. In National Treasury Employees'
Union v. Von Raab,65 the United States District Court in Louisiana held that
compulsory urinalysis coupled with a requirement that the employee fill out
55. One example of this is testing with a lie detector.
56. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
57. Id. at 765.
58. Id. at 775 (Black, J., dissenting).
59. 23 C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974).
60. Id. at , 48 C.M.R. at 797.
61. 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1982).
62. United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. at -, 48 C.M.R. at 799.
63. Id. at .... 48 C.M.R. at 798; see United States v. Musguire, 9 C.M.A.
67, 25 C.M.R. 329 (1958) (struck down order to submit to a blood alcohol test under
Art. 31); United States v. Jordan, 7 C.M.A. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957) (order to
furnish a urine specimen for chemical analysis was illegal; conviction was set aside);
United States v. Rosato, 3 C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953) (order to furnish
handwriting exemplars is illegal as violative of accused's Art. 31 right against self-
incrimination).
64. United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. at __ , 48 C.M.R. at 798 n.1.
65. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
1987]
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a pre-test form violated the employee's fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination. 66
The drug testing plan at issue was the U.S. Customs Service requirement
that "workers who seek promotion into certain covered positions ... submit
to drug screening through urinalysis." 67 The district court held that the tests
violated the employee's fifth amendment right, distinguishing the case from
Schmerber in three ways. First, Schmerber required probable cause; the Cus-
toms Service's testing procedure involved workers who were not even under
suspicion. Second, Schmerber only involved a blood test while the testing
procedure under review also required the employee to complete a pre-test
form. Finally, the Customs Service plan, unlike the test in Schmerber, was
found to be an embarrassing and degrading procedure.6 8
However, the decision was vacated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.6 9 The circuit court rejected the district court's attempt to distinguish
the case from Schmerber, holding instead that mandatory urine testing did
not implicate fifth amendment rights.70 The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was held to apply only to testimonial evidence, not to the "physical
characteristics" revealed by urinalysis. 7'
Thus, it seems clear that the fifth amendment is not a major factor in
determining the constitutionality of employee drug testing even though "re-
gardless of the order's purpose, the accused knows that compliance will in
fact produce incriminating evidence." 72 Once the test has occurred, the em-
ployee's ability to protect himself against self-incrimination is much more
limited because the results are already in the hands of third parties. The fifth
amendment arguably should provide for protection before the test. However,
in light of the foregoing cases, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is not a viable defense for federal employees when faced with
the prospect of mandatory drug testing.
C. Drug Testing as a Violation of the Fourth
Amendment Prohibition Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The most important constitutional protection against mandatory drug
testing is the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
66. Id. at 388. The form asked the employee to state any medications taken
and circumstances in which he may have been in contact with illegal substances within
30 days.
67. Id. at 382.
68. Id. at 388. The procedure called for a collector to be present in the
restroom during the process requiring that observation be "close but not 'direct."'
Id. at 382. The court stated: "This gross invasion of privacy is a degrading procedure
that so detracts from human dignity and self respect that it 'shocks the conscience'
and offends this Court's sense of justice." Id. at 388.
69. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987).
70. Id. at 181.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. 181, -, 48 C.M.R. 797, 798 (1974).
[Vol. 52
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and seizures. 73 In dealing with chemical testing, there are two questions that
must be answered. First, is compulsory urinalysis a search or seizure within
the meaning of the fourth amendment?74 If so, is the search or seizure rea-
sonable?75
1. Was There a Search or Seizure?
The United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. State of Califarnia,
examined whether the extraction of blood for chemical analysis was a search
or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.76 The Court declared
that "[t]he overriding function of the fourth amendment is to protect per-
sonal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."' 77 The
Court held that the extraction of blood for analysis "plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the fourth amend-
ment."
7 8
Courts have applied Schmerber to breathalyzer tests, 79 and at least four
cases have treated urine tests as searches within the ambit of the fourth
amendment.80 These decisions make it apparent that mandatory drug testing
by urinalysis is a search and seizure within the fourth amendment. 81
73. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Co sT. amend. IV.
74. See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
75. Id. at 489.
76. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
77. Id. at 767.
78. Id. The Supreme Court added that "[sluch testing procedures plainly
constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,'
within the meaning of that Amendment." Id.
79. See, e.g., Davis v. District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417, 418 (D.C. 1968);
State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 847 (R.I. 1980); State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849, 856,
391 A.2d 107, 111 (1978).
80. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (D.D.C. 1986);
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
81. But see Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1010 (D.C.
1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring). Judge Nebeker in his concurring opinion expressed
the view that urinalysis was not within the ambit of the fourth amendment. Id. He
distinguished between the intrusions on the physical body and the "seizure of an
individual's physical characteristics," finding that seizure of the characteristics would
not be protected by the fourth amendment because it did "not involve the same
degree of intrusion into an individual's privacy because such physical characteristics
are constantly exposed to the public." Id. In other words, Judge Nebeker felt there
was no right to be free of search or seizure under the fourth amendment because
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2. Was the Search Reasonable?
Once it is determined that there has been a search or seizure, the court
must next examine whether that search or seizure was reasonable.8 2 In the
case of mandatory drug testing, no warrants are sought or issued before
testing. The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches "are per se
unreasonable under the fourth amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." 83 One such exception involves
exigent circumstances, such as the risk that evidence could vanish or be
destroyed while a warrant was being obtained. 4 Another exception concerns
certain classes of government employees.8 5 A third exception is the distinction
between a search for criminal purposes and a search for administrative pur-
poses.8 6 The final exception to the warrant requirement is that for a search
which has been voluntarily consented to.8 7
Thus, in order to determine whether mandatory drug testing was a rea-
sonable search and seizure the court must examine it in light of the above-
mentioned exceptions to the general rule regarding warrantless searches.88
Should the search fail under these exceptions, it would give rise to a cause
of action for violation of the employee's fourth amendment rights.
a. Exigent Circumstances
As stated earlier, one justification for a warrantless search is the risk
that the evidence could be destroyed while a warrant was being obtained 9
82. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
83. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
84. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (blood
analysis to determine alcohol content).
85. While all cases hold that a government employee does not give up his
constitutional rights by working for the government, courts do limit the employees'
reasonable expectation of privacy according to his job. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612
F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d
1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985). Courts have also limited the employees' reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in jobs where public safety considerations require it. See Division
241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga.
1985). But cf. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986) (re-
quiring adversarial pre-termination hearing; holding employee had property interest
in job and liberty interest in reputation).
86. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986). The court
in Shoemaker stated that the State may conduct administrative warrantless searches
when "the pervasive regulation of the industry must have reduced the justifiable
privacy expectation of the subject of the search." Id.
87. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
88. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
89. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
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This argument was considered to be appropriate by the United States Supreme
Court in Schmerber v. California;" however, it is not equally applicable to
the issue of urinalysis to detect drug use. Schmerber involved a blood test
to determine the percentage of alcohol in the petitioner's blood.9' The Court
found that "the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system." 92
For these reasons, the Court held that:
Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the
accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was
no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special
facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol
content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest.9 3
The Court's reasoning in Schmerber can be argued to be inapplicable to
employee drug testing through urinalysis in two ways. First, the search is not
done incident to arrest or accompanied by the probable cause necessary for
arrest.94 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the exigent circumstances
discussed in Schmerber do not exist in cases of urinalysis. 95 Unlike blood-
alcohol level, the effects of drugs such as marijuana remain in the urine for
up to a month.9 6 This makes it much harder for a court to determine, as
was done in Schmerber, that there was no time to get a search warrant. 97
b. Government Employees
No court has held that an employee gives up his constitutional rights by
virtue of working for the government.9 8 However, a class of cases have
emerged involving searches of government employees which allow an excep-
tion to the general rule against warrantless searches by limiting the employees'
expectation of privacy.99
90. Id.
91. Id. at 758-59.
92. Id. at 770.
93. Id. at 770-71.
94. For a discussion of Missouri's interpretation of Schmerber, see infra notes
155-62 and accompanying text.
95. See Rust, supra note 27, at 52 ("Urine retains a trace of drugs for a
period of days, sometimes even weeks, long after the drug has ceased to affect mental
capacity.").
96. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, at A12, col. 6.
97. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
98. See supra note 85.
99. See United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 989 (1975) (warrantless search of a postal employee's locker for stolen mail
upheld as reasonable); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 960, reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966) (warrantless search of Cus-
toms employee's jacket was reasonable where his supervisors had grounds to believe
1987]
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In Allen v. City of Marietta,"00 a United States District Court in Georgia
summarized the theme of this group of cases as follows:
Government employees ... have as much of a right to be free from war-
rantless government searches as any other citizens. At the same time, how-
ever, the government has the same right as any private employer to oversee
its employees and investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's
performance of his duties .... Because the government as employer has the
same rights to discover and prevent employee misconduct relevant to the
employee's performance of her duties, the employee cannot really claim a
legitimate expectation of privacy from searches of that nature. Added to
this balance of expectations and interests is the fact that government inves-
tigations of employee misconduct always carry the potential to become crim-
inal investigations .... [C]ourts have been unwilling to find that the fourth
amendment does not protect government employees from warrantless searches
undertaken for a criminal investigatory purpose.'01
In Allen, the district court allowed the warrantless drug testing of employees
of the Board of Lights and Water "for evidence of misconduct relvant to
the employee's performance of his duties."' 02
The court in McDonell v. Hunter,13 held that requiring employees work-
ing for the Department of Corrections to submit to chemical analysis violated
the fourth amendment unless it was "on the basis of a reasonable suspicion,
based on specific objective facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those
facts in light of experience, that the employee is then under the influence of
alcohol . . . or controlled substances.' 1 4
In Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police,05 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held that the order of the Metropolitan Police Department that
"the Department for administrative purposes may compel police officers to
he was pilfering goods coming through customs). But see United States v. Hagarty,
388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968) (evidence obtained as a result of warrantless wiretap of
a government employee's conversation was inadmissible in subsequent perjury trial);
United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (warrantless search of em-
ployee's desk for evidence of petty larceny violated her fourth amendment rights).
100. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
101. Id. at 491.
102. Id.
103. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
104. Id. at 1130. The court limited its holding by stating that:
The Fourth Amendment... does not preclude taking a [urine] specimen
as part of a pre-employment physical examination or as part of any routine
periodic physical examination that may be required of employees, nor does
it prohibit taking a specimen of blood, urine, or breath on a periodic basis
as a condition of continued employment under a disciplinary disposition if
such condition is reasonably related to the underlying basis for the disci-
plinary action and the duration of the condition is specified and is reasonable
in length.
Id. at 1130 n.6.
105. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
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submit to urinalysis testing based upon 'suspected drug use' or 'at the dis-
cretion' of the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons" was not unconstitu-
tional.c06 In reaching their decision, the court examined the concept of a
"legitimate expectation of privacy," finding that "[e]ach individual's privacy
interest is shaped by the context in which it is asserted.' ' 0 7 The court con-
cluded that "not all individuals enjoy the same expectation of privacy, and,
therefore, not the same degree of fourth amendment protection."'' 10 In ex-
amining the role of the police force in society, the court held that the "police
officers may in certain circumstances enjoy less constitutional protection than
the ordinary citizen .... [and] that this [was] one of those circumstances."'19
In Suscy, the United States District Court of Appeals upheld the re-
quirement that any bus driver involved in a serious accident or suspected of
being intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics submit to a blood or
urine test."0 The court balanced the interest of protecting the public against
the individual interest in "refusing to disclose physical evidence of intoxi-
cation or drug abuse," and decided that the "valid public interest justifie[d]
the intrusion contemplated.""'
A reading of the cases mentioned in this section gives the impression
that searches of government employees are valid due to the rights of the
employer to regulate his employees and the reduced expectation of privacy.
It is important to note, however, that the cases mentioned previously were
easy cases for purposes of the balancing test. Allen involved city employees
handling high voltage electricity;" 2 McDonell involved employees working in
a prison facility;" 3 Turner involved police officers;" 4 and Suscy involved bus
106. Id. at 1007.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1007-08.
109. Id. at 1008. The court called the police a "para-military organization
dealing hourly with the general public in delicate and often dangerous situations."
Id.
110. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir. 1976).
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 484 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The
court in Allen held: "The City has a right to make warrantless searches of its em-
ployees for the purpose of determining whether they are using or abusing drugs which
would affect their ability to perform safely their work with hazardous materials."
Id. at 491.
113. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809
F.2d 1302 (1987). The court in McDonell stated: "Correctional facility security con-
siderations reduce the scope of reasonable expectations of privacy that one normally
holds and makes reasonable some intrusions that would not be reasonable outside of
the facility." Id. at 1128. The court went on to say, however, that "prison employees
do not lose all of their Fourth Amendment rights at the prison gates." Id.
114. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985). The
court in Turner specifically stated: "The public interest consideration is strong in
relation to the test of the police officer, but not in the instance of a private citizen.
The normal constitutional requirements in relation to private citizens are not man-
dated here." Id. at 1009.
1987]
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drivers who had been involved in serious accidents or suspected of being
under the influence while on duty." 5 Not every case would present such a
strong public interest.
In cases where the public interest is weaker the expectation of privacy
would be greater, thus presenting a stronger case for fourth amendment
protection." 6 One such case is Jones v. McKenzie." 7 The plaintiff in Mc-
Kenzie was a school bus attendant who assisted handicapped students in
traveling by bus to and from school." 8 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff had "a reasonable expectation
of privacy from a search by mandatory drug testing,"" 9 and ruled that the
testing violated her fourth amendment rights. 20
It should be noted that even the cases which allowed the search required
a finding of reasonable cause.' 2' Thus, while the searches may not fall under
the general rule of unconstitutionality of warrantless searches, they would
appear to require a reasonable suspicion. 22
c. Administrative or Criminal Purposes
A third arena in which courts have permitted warrantless chemical testing
by government employers is where the search is for administrative purposes
as distinguished from a search as part of a criminal investigation.
In Shoemaker v. Handel, 23 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit recognized an exception to the warrant requirement in cases
where there is a strong state interest in conducting an unannounced search,
and "the pervasive regulation of the industry ... ha[s] reduced the justifiable
privacy expectation of the subject of the search."' 24
115. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir. 1976); see text accompanying notes 10-12.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
117. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
118. Id. at 1508.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1509.
121. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir. 1976); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985);
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985).
122. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (drug
testing of fire fighters without individualized suspicion is invalid). But see National
Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (Customs
Service drug testing program upheld).
123. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 1142; see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981). The
Court in Donovan explained: "It is the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal
regulat[ory] [scheme] that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to
render an inspection program reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 606.
[Vol. 52
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The court in Shoemaker examined the regulations of the State Racing
Commission, which required all jockeys to submit to breathalyzer tests and
random urinalysis tests at the race track so as to discover the use of alcohol
or drugs.1 25 It was the plaintiffs' position that the tests could not be conducted
in the absence of "individualized suspicion."' 6 The court examined the his-
tory of intense regulation which the horse racing industry had enforced in
New Jersey and concluded that "the licensees have always participated in
the industry with full awareness that it is the subject of intense state regu-
lation." 127
The court held that the state's "strong interest in assuring the public of
the integrity of the horse racing industry" outweighed the plaintiffs' right
to be free from warrantless testing. 2 For those reasons, the court held that
"the administrative search exception applie[d] to warrantless breath and urine
testing of employees in the heavily regulated horseracing industry."' 29
The next issue the court examined was whether the Commission's dis-
cretion in conducting the searches was sufficiently circumscribed. 30 In other
words, does a random selection method satisfy the requirements of the fourth
amendment? In deciding this issue, the court observed that "[riandom searches
and seizures that have been held to violate the fourth amendment have left
the exercise of discretion as to selected targets in the hands of a field officer
with no limiting guidelines."'' The court found that in this case the tests
were administered pursuant to the regulatory scheme with the Steward having
125. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1137-38. The plaintiffs objected to the tests on
the basis of violation of fourteenth amendment due process rights, violation of the
equal protection clause and violation of their privacy rights under the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 1141.
126. Id. at 1141. The plaintiffs conceded that the tests could be validly ad-
ministered "if the racing officials [were] aware of specific objective facts suggesting
that certain persons [had] recently used alcohol or drugs." Id.; see also Capua v.
City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986).
127. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1141. These regulations included the licensing of
all employees in the industry. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-33 (West Supp. 1985).
128. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. The court also found that the intense
regulation of the industry reduced the justifiable expectations of privacy of persons
who sought and obtained a license to participate therein. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1143. All jockeys were required to take a breathalyzer test daily,
while the urine tests were administered at random. The names of all the jockeys
participating in a race were placed in an envelope and a representative of the racing
commission drew the names of from three to five jockeys for testing. The selected
jockeys had to provide the sample after the last race of that day. The results were
marked with identifying numbers and sent to a laboratory for testing. Id. at 1139-
40.
131. Id. at 1143 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)); see also
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975).
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no discretion.'32 Because the daily determination of who would be tested was
made by the Commission, the court held that it did not violate the fourth
amendment." 31
The court of appeal's decision in Shoemaker had several effects. It
established the exception for administrative searches in the area of chemical
testing. 34 More importantly, it provided that some administrative searches
could be upheld as valid although no individualized suspicion of the employee
existed at the time of the search. 3 For these reasons, the court's decision
in Shoemaker broadened the exception for government employees where there
is a strong public interest and the "pervasive regulation of the industry [has]
reduced the justifiable privacy expectation of the [employee]."' 3 6
However, any change in the position of the courts regarding fourth
amendment protection following Shoemaker is minimal. The court itself in
Shoemaker limited its holding to "breathalyzer and urine sampling of vol-
untary participants in a highly regulated industry."' 137 This could be inter-
preted by the courts to include only industries which license all of their
employees,' or even further limited to encompass only the horse racing
industry.3 9 A court faced with a compelling case of invasion of privacy could
have considerable discretion in interpreting Shoemaker. 4'
3. Was There Consent?
A test that would otherwise be unreasonable nevertheless does not violate
the fourth amendment if it was done pursuant to voluntary consent.1 41 The
Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte described voluntariness as "a
132. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143. For a description of the lottery method
used, see supra note 130.
133. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143.
134. Id. at 1142.
135. Id. at 1143.
136. Id. at 1142.
137. Id. at 1142 n.5.
138. The court made a point of the fact that plaintiffs were licensees who were
aware of the regulation of the industry. Id. at 1142.
139. Id. at 1142 n.5. The court specifically said its decision "should not be
read as dispositive of the distinct issue presented in testing of children subject to
mandatory school attendance laws or the testing of motor vehicle drivers." Id.
140. Id. at 1142-43. The court did not indulge in broad terms but continually
framed its holding to apply to "employees of the horse racing industry." Id.
141. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Bustamonte, the
Court stated:
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts tojustify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact vol-
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question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances .... ,,142 In
response to suggestions that mandatory drug testing might violate an em-
ployee's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, Attorney
General Edwin Meese said, "By definition, it's not an unreasonable seizure
because it's something the employe [sic] consents to as a condition [of his
employment] ."143
In McDonell v. Hunter,'44 the United States District in Iowa disagreed.
McDonell involved mandatory drug testing of prison employees. The De-
partment of Corrections contended that, even if the test violated the reason-
ableness standard of the fourth amendment, it was still valid because the
plaintiffs "signed a written consent validly consent[ing] to searches under
the Department's policy.' 1 45
The district court held that it could not "rest its decision on [the] as-
sumption that plaintiff McDonell and class members who signed consents
voluntarily consented in advance to any search made under the Department's
policy.' 1 46 The court added that, "the consent form does not constitute a
blanket waiver of all fourth amendment rights."' 47 The function of the con-
sent form was characterized by the court as "serv[ing] to alert employees to
the fact that their fourth amendment rights are more limited inside the cor-
rectional institution, but the consent cannot be construed to be a valid consent
to any search other than one that is, under the circumstances, reasonable
and, therefore, permissible under the Fourth Amendment." ' 4 Thus, in
McDonell, the court provided that voluntary consent may be used to limit
the reasonable expectation of privacy but cannot be used to legalize unrea-
sonable searches. 149
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MISSOURI
At the present time, Missouri courts have not examined the issue of
employee drug testing. Because of the increase in the number of cases in-
volving drug testing across the country, however, it is likely to become an
issue in Missouri.
Since there has been no definitive position set forth by the United States
Supreme Court, state courts are deciding these cases with no firm precedent
to rely on. Missouri has dealt with the issue of blood tests to determine blood
142. Id. at 248-49.
143. Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1986, at A3, col. 4.
144. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
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alcohol level in criminal cases. 50 Because courts have dealt with the issue of
urinalysis in much the same way as blood testing,' 5' a discussion of Missouri's
position on this issue is helpful.
In 1982, the Missouri General Assembly rewrote section 577.020 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri 52 and adopted section 577.041,151 dealing with
the administering of chemical tests to determine blood alcohol level.Y4
In State v. Ikerman,155 the Missouri Court of Appeals construed Schmer-
ber v. State of California5 6 and the Missouri chemical testing statutes. 5 7 In
Ikerman, the defendant was involved in a traffic accident. 158 The State argued
that under Schmerber it had the right to take a blood sample from the defendant
without his consent, a warrant, or an arrest.'59 However, the court of appeals
interpreted Schmerber as applying only to a search incident to a lawful
arrest. 160
The court held that in Missouri, "a blood sample may be taken without
a warrant to test for intoxication without offending federal constitutional
guarantees and Missouri statutes where the defendant is under arrest and has
not negated his implied consent under [section] 577.020 by invoking his right
of refusal under [section] 577.041.11161 Because the defendant was not under
arrest, this implied consent did not apply to him. 162
150. See, e.g., State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State
v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020 (1986);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.041 (1986).
151. Most of the cases discussed previously have used the standards set out in
Schmerber in analyzing the drug testing issues. Schmerber dealt with a blood test to
determine blood alcohol level. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
152. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020 (1986).
153. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041 (1986).
154. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020(1) (1986) (implied consent to the test if a party
is arrested for the offense); Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.041 (1986) (allows a party to refuse
the chemical test but authorizes revocation of the party's license for doing so).
155. 698 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
156. 384 U.S. .757 (1966).
157. See supra note 154.
158. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d at 904.
159. Id. It was the State's position that under Schmerber, "where police of-
ficers have probable cause to believe [the] defendant has committed a crime in which
intoxication is an element and exigent circumstances exist, the taking of a blood
sample in a reasonable manner without consent, warrant, or arrest is constitutionally
permissible." Id. at 904-05.
160. Id. at 905.
161. Id. at 906. It was the court's position that section 577.020 was enacted
by the legislature in response to Schmerber. Id. at 905. Section 577.020 provides for
implied consent to allow the chemical test, while section 577.041 gives the defendant
the right to refuse that consent. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.020, .041 (1986).
162. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d at 906.
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The state also argued that the defendant did, in fact, consent to the
extraction of the blood sample. 163 The court held that defendant's consent
after initial refusal was involuntary consent. 1' 4 For those reasons, the court
excluded the evidence of the results of the testing of defendant's blood al-
cohol level. 165
In State v. Copeland,166 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that persons
have "an expectation of privacy in the contents of [their] blood which Mis-
souri law recognize[s] as legitimate." 1 67 For this reason, the court held that
when "[t]he blood was taken at the direction of a physician for use in testing
for medical purposes . . . the implied consent is limited to those purposes." 68
In other words, the hospital, by giving defendant's blood sample to law
enforcement authorities, violated his constitutional right to privacy. 169
In view of Missouri's limited reading of Schmerber, and its recognition
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the body's fluids, it is reasonable
to presume that the constitutional analysis of mandatory drug testing in
Missouri will be similar to that of the states which have examined drug cases
previously.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has come full circle and now must examine the original
question. Do government employees have any recourse against mandatory
drug testing? It could be argued that such testing is a violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. But given the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Von Rabb,170 the chances to prevail on this ground are slim. This
is unfortunate as the fifth amendment would offer just the type of protection
employees seek: freedom to refuse to take the test, not relief after the test
is already forcibly imposed.
It could be argued that drug testing constitutes a denial of due process
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, including a pre-termination hear-
ing or post-termination hearing. However, even if an employee prevailed on
163. Id. at 907.
164. Id. When asked to take the blood test, the defendant declined. After a
lengthy discussion with law enforcement officers, the defendant agreed to take the
test. Id. at 904. The court stated: "Once the voluntariness is challenged, the state
carries the burden of proving the voluntariness of the consent by a preponderance
of the evidence." Id. at 907.
165. Id. at 908.
166. 680 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
167. Id. at 329.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 330.




Mell: Mell: Employee Drug Testing
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
this ground, it would only entitle him to more process and the possibility of
a repeat of the EMIT test or a similar back-up test. This would not prevent
the employer from requiring an employee to submit to another drug test,
but in fact would give him the right to be tested further. While due process
is a valid challenge for an employee who is innocent and wishes to prove it,
it does not offer a very suitable alternative to someone whose sensibilities
are offended by the compulsory urinalysis.
Another possibility which would enable an employee to avoid testing
entirely is the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If the search did not fall within any of the exceptions for exigent
circumstances, government employees, or administrative searches, and was
found to be unreasonable, the employee could prevent the test from being
administered at all.
In conclusion, what constitutional provision a party chooses to claim
protection under depends upon what type of relief that party seeks and the
facts of the particular case. Any theory would be valid for some cases and
invalid for others, and until there are some definitive standards set out by
the higher courts, the issues will be decided on a case by case basis. At this
point in time, the only thing that can be predicted with any certainty is that
the drug testing issue will be with us well into the future. What began with
a presidential mandate, and presently resides in the ad hoc decisionmaking
process of the district and appellate courts, will one day be examined by the
Supreme Court. But until that time attorneys will have to deal with this
issue in the shadow of Schmerber7 l and its progeny. The more interesting
question is whether the Supreme Court, when faced with the issue, will use
its analysis in Schmerber in the area of employee drug testing, or limit
Schmerber to its unique circumstances. 72 The Court may rise to the challenge
of the drug testing issue by blazing a new trail and developing standards
which are truly applicable to the issue raised in the context of employee drug
testing.
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171. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
172. Schmerber involved a breathalyzer test to measure blood alcohol level
administered pursuant to a lawful arrest. Id. at 758-59.
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